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Criminal Law-Manslaughter-Liability of Non-driving Automobile Owner[New York].-The defendant, aware of the defective condition of the brakes on his
car, lent it to another who was also familiar with the condition of the brakes. While
using the car in the commission of his own business, the borrower, because of the faulty
brakes, struck the deceased and inflicted injuries which caused her death. Held, both
the defendant and the borrower guilty of manslaughter in the second degree. People v.
Rauch.,
Although this seems to be a case of first instance, it does not present any inherently
new problems which have not been dealt with by both tort and criminal law. Formerly,
non-driving automobile owners were held liable in tort only where the principle of
respondeatsuperior could apply.2 Increased development and use of automobiles and
the dangers created thereby accentuated the need for a more exacting liability. To
meet this need, the fiction of respondeat superiorwas stretched, by many courts, beyond its normal borders3 in the development of the family car doctrine.4 Moreover,
in many cases, where the facts paralleled those in the instant one, the owner was held
liable in torts
This expansion of social responsibility was not confined to tort law, but also has
found expression in the criminal law. It has been held that an officer of a railroad
could be guilty of manslaughter where negligence was shown in hiring of incompetent
engineers or the control of train operations.6 Similarly, an owner, who knowingly
permitted an intoxicated driver the use of his car, has been held guilty of manslaughter. 7 Since an accident may be caused either by an incompetent driver or a defective
car, and since there seems to be no significant difference between lending a defective
car to a competent driver or lending a good car to an incompetent driver, the result in
the instant case appears correct. Unless perhaps the driver of the car intentionally
caused the homicide, a court, as in the tort cases,8 should have no difficulty in establishing the necessary causal relationship.9 Such could be found in the defendant's
reckless disregard of the safety of others in permitting the use of his defective car.
The trend suggested by the decision in the instant case would not make criminal
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RECENT CASES
liability coextensive with that in tort. The directed verdicto and the statutory necessity for the jury to find "culpable"" negligence would afford sufficient safeguards
against any extreme applications,"2 whatever meaning may be given "culpable."
Declaratory Judgment-Alternative or Exclusive Remedy-[Ohio].-The plaintiff
lessor, having given due notice of default in payment of rent and taxes on the part of
the defendant lessee, served him with notices of intention to terminate their ninety-nine
year lease and to reenter the premises as stipulated in the forfeiture clause. Demand
for possession not being complied with, the lessor brought an action under authority
of the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act, asking the court to declare, (a) the lease
terminated, (b) that the lessor had the right to reenter the premises, and (c) that the
lessee be ordered to surrender possession thereof. The lower court refused a declaration on the ground that the plaintiff has full and complete remedies in either statutory
action of forcible entry and detainer or an action of ejectment. The plaintiff appeals.
Held, judgment affirmed. Proceeding for declaratory judgment is not substitute or
alternative for common-law actions. Eiffel Really 6 Investment Co. v. Ohio Citizens
Trust Co. et al.2
The majority opinion seems to have lost sight of the purpose and intent underlying
the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act. The requirements of modern practice demand a liberal interpretation of the Act. The declaratory judgment includes, but is
not to be confined to, cases which are justiciable but which are not yet ripe for coercive
relief. In this type of case declaratory judgment is exclusive. However, there is another type of case which was meant to be included under the Uniform Declaratory
Judgment Act, namely, that in which the plaintiff has a right to ask for consequential
relief, but, because of a desire to maintain relations with the defendant or a belief that
a mere declaration of rights would suffice, he does not wish to demand the exacting
and final results of ordinary coercive relief. English practice,3 the terms of the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act,4 and the majority of the American state decisionss
affirm this option of declaratory or coercive relief. To the contrary are New York decisions on which the Ohio court heavily relied. However, while broad discretion is
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